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In this paper, we develop a model of law enforcement with the possibility of corruption 
between enforcers and potential offenders. We study how the violation rate changes with 
the  level  of  the  fine  imposed  on  violations.  We  find,  in  contrast  to  the  conventional 
wisdom,  that  the  fine  level  that  minimizes  violations  can  be  intermediate  rather  than 
large. We then study conditions under which different fine levels would be optimal.    
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Anecdotal evidence and media accounts as well as surveys conducted indicate that petty 
corruption is common in many developing and transition countries to varying degrees.
1 
One form of petty corruption involves bribing low-level civil servants or middle-ranking 
government officials to get them disregard violation of certain rules and regulations that 
are profitable to violate, although this would normally result in punishment in the form of 
a fine. The apparent winners here are the parties at both ends of the corrupt transaction 
and  the  apparent  loser  is  the  government  that  is  left  in  the  dark  about  uncollected 
fines/revenue. However, depending upon the circumstances, the public at large may fall 
victim to this type of petty corruption with more severe consequences and much higher 
costs than the losses in potential revenues of the government, as in the cases of violations 
of traffic rules and environmental safety regulations or defiance of building safety codes 
developed against earthquakes, floods, fire hazards etc. The consequences of this type of 
petty corruption may indeed be grave, involving casualties and property damage incurred 
in a wide range of circumstances from an accident caused by an intoxicated driver who is 
kept  on  the  road  to  an  earthquake  causing  thousands  of  people  to  fall  victim  to  the 
violations of safety codes by contractors.
2 
The possibility of corruption complicates the task of designing a deterrence policy 
for these violations, since only some of the offenders will pay the designated fine, while 
the others will get away by paying a bribe instead, which is typically smaller than the 
fine. In this paper, we develop a model to study how the deterrence policy (specifically, 
the  level  of  the  fine)  changes  the  offenders’  and  the  enforcers’  attitudes  towards 
corruption and therefore the resulting violation rate. We also provide an example where, 
in contrast to the conventional wisdom, an intermediate fine minimizes the violation rate 
rather than a large fine.  
This result follows from the expectation that an increase in fines would affect 
different types of potential offenders differently: Soaring fines would certainly be less 
effective on individuals for whom bribery is a tempting means of avoiding high fines as 
compared to individuals who are strongly opposed to bribery on moral grounds or as a 
                                                 
1 See Mocan (2004), Thampi (2004), Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2004), Tanzi (1998). 
 






response to the incentives provided for reporting corrupt enforcers. Then, increased fine 
levels may change the composition of the group of offenders, increasing the proportion of 
individuals (within this group) who view bribes as an acceptable alternative to high fines. 
This change in the offender profile simultaneously affects the incentive structure for the 
enforcers. Now facing more corruptible offenders, the enforcers become more likely to 
ask for a bribe, making violations less costly for some potential offenders. In other words, 
high  fines  may  lead  to  an  unintended  consequence  by  increasing  the  proportion  of 
offenders who are ready to pay bribes instead, and hence lowering the natural monitoring 
capacity put in place by violators who would prefer paying the associated fines to getting 
involved  in  a  corrupt  transaction,  when  they  get  caught.  Since  this  would  mean  a 
reduction in the risk of exposure for corrupt enforcers, the resulting equilibrium may 
induce more corruption and more violation than under the lower fine.
3 
After providing our example, we turn to the investigation of conditions under 
which an intermediate fine such as the one in the example would be preferable to a large 
fine.  We  show  that  intermediate  fines  are  superior  in  settings  with  i)  higher  rates  of 
detection for both the violation and the corrupt activity among the enforcers, ii) higher 
costs that a corrupt officer has to incur upon getting exposed, and iii) a lower proportion 
of potential offenders who are ready to cooperate with corrupt enforcers.  A major policy 
lesson that could be derived from our model then concerns the way that the instruments 
in the government’s arsenal should be combined: If the aim is to deter as many violations 
as  possible,  then  reducing  the  fine  for  the  violation  could  be  the  best  policy  to 
complement  increases  in  the  detection  effort  and  the  punishment  for  corruption,  or 
backing the civil society initiatives to fight corruption. 
                                                 
3 The possibility of corruption was in fact cited by a member of the Turkish Parliament as the reason behind 
the need to cut down the substantial hike in fines proposed in a draft bill aiming to curb the growth in the 
number of accidents on highways. The MP argued, in a rather diplomatic language, that the suggested 
increases would probably not be as effective as the authors of the draft thought, since they would create 
incentives for highway patrol officers to accept bribes from drivers getting caught as offenders. After some 
debate, the bill was modified to lower the originally proposed amounts of fines. Vereeck and Deben (2003) 
provide  support  to  this  view  by  pointing  to  the  negative  correlation  between  corruption  and  the 
effectiveness of traffic rules in the EU. It should be noted that in addition to diluting deterrence, corruption 
generates many other social costs which are beyond the scope of our analysis. The policy maker may 
choose to keep the fines low if these social costs are significant. What we show in this paper is that the 
policy maker can choose to set lower fines even when the sole objective is minimizing the violations and 






• Related Literature  
There is an extensive literature on the economics of law enforcement, pioneered 
by Becker (1968). Becker argues the optimality of keeping the fines on violations as large 
as possible (as opposed to increasing the detection rates or implementing non-monetary 
punishments,  since  these  alternative  instruments  are  costly  for  the  government).  The 
literature  to  follow  suggests  reasons  for  sustaining  a  less  than  maximal  fine  such  as 
valuations  exceeding  the  harm  of  the  crime,  risk  aversion,  heterogeneous  wealth 
constraints,  motivating  an  offender  to  choose  a  less  harmful  crime,  avoidance  costs.
4 
These studies are surveyed by Garoupa (1997). Our paper contributes to the strand of the 
literature offering corruption as another explanation for imposing intermediate fines. 
Becker  and  Stigler  (1974)  were  the  first  to  integrate  the  possibility  of  the 
enforcement’s corruption into Becker’s model. Bowles and Garoupa (1997) point to the 
fact that the demand for committing violations depends on the bribe rate, as well as the 
proportion of the corrupt enforcers. They argue that this proportion is endogenous and it 
increases with the fine level. In the Bowles and Garoupa model, it is easy to see that the 
possibility of corruption dilutes the deterrence effect of a fine. Moreover Chang, Lai, and 
Yang (2000) show that the violation rate may be non-monotonic in the fine level when a 
psychological  cost  for  corruption,  which  is  decreasing  in  the  rate  of  corruption,  is 
integrated into the enforcer preferences.
5 However, in both Bowles-Garoupa and Chang- 
Lai-Yang  models,  a  fine  level  that  is  sufficiently  large  wipes  out  violations  and 
corruption altogether. In the earlier studies, it is argued that this violation deterrent fine 
level may be infeasible due to an exogenous upper bound on the implementable fine 
levels. In contrast, we show that the violation minimizing fine level may be intermediate 
even in the absence of an upper bound on the implementable fine. 
Another paper that deals with a similar research question to ours is written by 
Kugler, Verdier, and Zenou (2005). In their model, crime is committed by competing 
criminal organizations. These organizations invest in corruption to reduce the probability 
                                                 
4 See for instance Polinsky and Shavell (1979, 1991) and Malik (1990). 
 
5 See also Mookherjee and Png (1995) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001) for similar nonmonotonicity results 
in the context of punishment levels for corrupt activities. The former paper considers the costly monitoring 
effort by corruptible enforcers, whereas the latter one accounts for “framing” and “extortion” by these 






of  conviction  of  their  recruits.  Kugler,  Verdier,  and  Zenou  show,  under  some 
parameterization of their model, that increasing the fine level beyond a certain threshold 
increases  the  organizations’  demand  for  corruption.  The  resulting  higher  level  of 
corruption reduces the expected cost of committing a crime, and thus increases the crime 
rate. We utilize a similar interaction between the corruption and the violation rates to 
establish  the  adverse  effects  of  increasing  the  fine  level.  However,  in  contrast  to  the 
demand side argument of Kugler, Verdier, and Zenou, our model sustains the optimality 
of an intermediate fine through the simultaneous expectation updates in both sides of the 
market for corruption. 
Bayar (2005) also emphasizes the importance of expectations in the success of 
corrupt  transactions.  In  briber  initiated  corruption,  bribers  may  have  incomplete 
information about which officers are corrupt and how much bribe they should be offered. 
Bayar  argues  that  agencies  offering  intermediary  services  between  the  government 
offices and the clients reduce the inefficiencies due to the incompleteness of information.   
Finally, our research is also related to the literature on multi-agent mechanism 
design  with  collusion  between  the  privately  informed  agents.  However  our  approach 
differs from the mechanism design approach since the “policy maker” we conceptualize 
has discretion only on the level of the fine, rather than on all possible dimensions of 
individual compensations.
6  
• The Setup  
Our model will build on a game theoretic setup with potential offenders and law 
enforcers  as  its  players.
7  In  line  with  earlier  studies  on  the  economics  of  crime,  we 
assume  that  different  types  of  potential  offenders  have  different  valuations  for  the 
violation of a certain rule. We diverge from the earlier literature by introducing a second 
dimension of differentiation for the potential offenders. In our model, potential offenders 
are allowed to have different attitudes towards corruption as well. Specifically, a potential 
offender is either opportunistic / cooperative (i.e., he does not mind paying a bribe in 
order to avoid the fine for his violation), or righteous / uncooperative (i.e., he would 
rather  pay  the  fine  instead  of  engaging  himself  in  a  corrupt  activity).  A  potential 
                                                 
6 For a recent treatment of the mechanism design approach, see Che and Kim (2006). 
  






offender’s valuation from a violation and his attitude towards corruption are both private 
information. 
Coming to the enforcers, we model them as players who are ready to ask for 
bribes as long as they know that they are facing an opportunistic offender. However, 
asking a bribe from a righteous offender is costly for an enforcer, since such an offender 
may report the enforcer’s demand to the authorities. An enforcer’s decision whether to 
ask for a bribe depends on her expectation on the cooperativeness of the offender and the 
cost of being reported as a corrupt enforcer. Our model allows for this cost to vary among 
enforcers. 
The present paper follows a different approach also in modeling the process that 
determines the bribe level. Earlier studies of corruption employ the assumption that the 
proceeds from corruption are proportionally shared by the parties involved in the corrupt 
transaction. In our environment, this would imply a constant bribe/fine ratio regardless of 
the  level  of  the  fine.  To  capture  possible  interactions  between  posted  fines  and  the 
bribe/fine ratio, we adopt an alternative assumption and let the bribe level be determined 
by  a  corruption  syndicate  that  consists  of  enforcers  involved  in  bribe  taking.  This 
syndicate sets the bribe level to maximize the expected payoff to its members after the 
fine level is observed but before the potential offenders make their violation decisions.
 8   
The corruption syndicate in our setup can be thought as literally an organized 
structure within the enforcement hierarchy or, alternatively, as a proxy for the culture of 
corruption among enforcers. What is crucial for our results is the commitment power that 
comes with the syndicate. By aligning herself with the syndicate, an enforcer commits to 
the bribe level she will ask from a violator.
9 
                                                 
8 The idea of commitment to a bribe level is similar to commitment to a detection probability prior to the 
violators’ decision to violate the rule. Both assumptions endow the enforcers with an instrument which 
affects the demand for violations. Polinsky (1980), Garoupa and Klerman (2002), and Dittmann (2006) 
study  how  private  enforcers  and  rent  seeking  governments  benefit  from  committing  to  a  detection 
probability in advance. See also Ghosh (2007) for a benevolent government’s commitment to enforcement 
instruments.
  Marjit and Shi (1998) argue that commitment to a revenue maximizing bribe level (as well as 
a revenue maximizing detection probability) can be possible in a repeated interaction setting.  
 
9 Once the violation is committed and detected by a corrupt enforcer, it is in the enforcer’s interest to ask 
for a bribe that is as high as possible. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that enforcers have creative 
ways of committing to a bribe level and making it public in advance of the violation. In Lebanon, for 






The rest of the discussion is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
model we work with. Section III shows the derivation of the equilibrium levels of bribe, 
corruption, and cooperation within the violators. Section IV presents the example with 
which we establish the optimality of an intermediate fine. Section V lays out conditions 
for the optimal fine to be an intermediate one. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
• Potential offenders 
Let  v  denote  the  monetary  equivalent  of  the  value  of  violating  the  rule  for  a 
potential offender. v is a random variable distributed uniformly over the support  ] , 0 [ v . 
The realization of v is private information for the potential offender. If a violation takes 
place, a law enforcer detects it with probability d.
10  
The second component of a potential offender’s private information is his attitude 
towards corruption. How an offender responds to a bribe offer is determined by whether 
he is opportunistic or righteous. A potential offender is opportunistic with probability p. 
In this case, he accepts to pay any bribe that is weakly smaller than the legal fine. With 
probability  p − 1 , he is righteous and prefers to pay the fine.  
The distinction we make between opportunistic and righteous offenders could be 
justified along the following lines. First, some people are observed to subjectively judge 
certain rules as fair to violate as long as they do not get caught. Perhaps the best examples 
are traffic violations such as exceeding speed limits or driving under the influence. Many 
people feel that the speed limits or tolerable levels of blood alcohol are set with inept 
drivers in mind and hence are too low for skilled drivers like themselves. They therefore 
do not see any harm in exceeding these limits as long as they do not get caught by the 
highway patrol, and they certainly do not see these violations as ethical misconducts. 
Some of these drivers would presumably get offended by the suggestion that they should 
                                                                                                                                                 
in “tips” (bakhsheesh) for various types of “services.” (Leenders and Sfakianakis, 2003). In Turkey, traffic 
patrol officers may refuse a portion of a bribe, offered by a traffic rule violator, that they deem excessive. 
 
10 Many earlier papers such as Becker (1968), Polinsky and Shavell (1979, 1991, 2001), Garoupa (2001) 
study the tradeoff between the level of the fine and the  detection rate. The general conclusion is that 
increasing the fine level is a “cheaper” instrument for deterring violations than increasing the detection rate. 







pay a bribe to be let go without getting a ticket. These individuals may very well choose 
to pay the associated fine and report the officer asking for a bribe rather than take part in 
a corrupt transaction.
11 Moreover, an increasing number of countries take measures to 
encourage  reporting  of  demands  for  bribes  varying  from  the  creation  of  hotlines  and 
establishment of special agencies to investigate reports (such as Singapore and South 
Africa), to incorporating special provisions into their penal codes to provide some sort of 
immunity to those who report corrupt enforcers (such as Hungary and Czech Republic).
12 
These measures not only encourage uncooperative or righteous behavior, but also curtail 
the possibility of opportunistic violators’ signaling their willingness to cooperate credibly 
to the enforcers –since any such communication by a violator can be perceived as a setup 
to detect corrupt enforcers when these measures are in effect.
13 
It is implicit in the above representation that a violator’s cooperation probability 
with a corrupt offer is independent from his valuation for the violation, as well as the fine 
level  (as  long  as  the  bribe  is  lower  than  the  fine).  These  assumptions  are  made  for 
tractability. We will discuss the robustness of our results under more realistic settings in 
the conclusion section. 
• Law Enforcers 
When  an  enforcer  asks  for  a  bribe  from  an  opportunistic  offender,  the  bribe 
revenue goes to the enforcer. On the other hand, when the bribe is demanded from a 
righteous offender, the corrupt enforcer will not only fail to collect the amount she hoped 
to receive but she will also risk getting exposed. Let e be the probability of exposure after 
asking for a bribe from a righteous offender and c be the monetary equivalent of the cost 
of exposure. This cost can depend on the characteristics of the enforcer such as rank, 
social standing, and prior misconduct. To reflect this variation in the cost of exposure, c 
                                                 
11 What we assume here is the existence of an authority, which can punish the corrupt officer and which is 
invulnerable to corruption itself. 
 
12 Commission of the European Communities, 2002; MVCR, 1999. 
 
13 In fact, this behavior is what lies behind the relatively small number of convictions that corrupt officers 
receive in courts in different countries, often through the use of marked bills in payments of bribes by 







is  set  to  be  a  random  variable  distributed  uniformly  over  the  support  ] , 0 [ c .
14    The 
realization of an enforcer’s exposure cost is private information for her.
15  
• Timing 
Stage 1: Government sets the fine level f.
16 
Stage 2: Each enforcer decides whether to join the corruption syndicate. 
Stage 3: The corruption syndicate sets the bribe level b. 
Stage  4:  Each  potential  offender  decides  whether  to  violate  the  rule.  If  a  violator  is 
detected, the detecting enforcer asks for a bribe if she is part of the syndicate or charges 
the fine if she is not. The violator pays the bribe if he is opportunistic or pays the fine if 
he is not. In case that the enforcer is corrupt and the violator is righteous, the enforcer 
incurs the exposure cost if she is detected.  
  We  now  concentrate  on  the  sequential  game  starting  with  stage  2,  after  the 
government’s announcement of the fine level. First we solve for the equilibrium levels of 
the bribe, the corruption in the law enforcement, the violations by the opportunistic and 
the righteous offenders. Then, we analyze how these endogenous variables change in 
response to possible changes in the fine level.  
The  relevant  solution  concept  for  this  sequential  setup  is the  subgame  perfect 
Nash equilibrium. As required, we conduct the analysis of the decisions of the players in 
reverse order. 
                                                 
14 Imposing an upper bound on the support of the distribution of c amounts to assuming “every enforcer has 
a price.” Although it is conceivable that there are incorruptible enforcers, once a considerable portion of the 
enforcement is corrupted, the incorrupt individuals within the enforcement force would be isolated and 
their existence would be irrelevant.   
 
15 Similar assumptions regarding the privacy of the enforcers’ cost from corruption are made in the earlier 
literature. See, for instance, Bayar (2005) and Garoupa and Jellal (2002). 
 
16 The term f also incorporates in the monetary equivalent of the non-monetary repercussions of getting 
fined (such as the establishment of a criminal record, accumulation of demerit points, etc.).  If the offense is 
punishable  by  imprisonment  or  some  other  penalty  rather  than  a  fine,  then  f  should  be  taken  as  the 
monetary equivalent of such penalty. However, nonmonetary punishments generally impose a deadweight 
loss on the society (See Garoupa and Klerman, 2004, Bac and Bag, 2006, and Dittmann, 2006). Under the 
presence of nonmonetary punishments, the government can be concerned about the extent of these costs as 
well as the extent of violations. In what follows, we abstract our analysis from the costs of nonmonetary 






• Violation decision  
A potential offender is already aware of the fine and the bribe levels when he 
makes  his  violation  decision.  He  also  knows  the  proportion  (q)  of  the  corrupt  law 
enforcers. This proportion determines the probability that he will be asked to pay the 
bribe. Potential offenders are assumed to be risk neutral. Therefore an offender violates 
the rule if the expected value of the fine and/or the bribe he has to pay is lower than his 
valuation for the violation. As a convention, we assume that a potential offender does not 
violate the rule if the value of the violation equals the expected cost of it. Accordingly, a 
righteous  potential  offender  violates  the  rule  if  v  >  df  and  a  opportunistic  potential 
offender violates the rule if  )] ( [ b f q f d v − − > . For an outsider who does not observe an 
offender’s private information, the probability that he will violate the rule is 
      )] ( 1 )[ 1 ( ))] ( ( 1 [ f F p b f q f F p − − + − − − .          (1) 
where F is the cumulative distribution function for v/d.
17 
   Conditional on violating the rule, the probability that an offender is opportunistic 
is given by 
               .
)] ( 1 )[ 1 (     ))] ( ( 1 [
))] ( ( 1 [
f F p b f q f F p
b f q f F p
r
− − + − − −
− − −
=                 (2) 
This  last  expression  is a  measure  of  the  expectation  on  an  offender’s  attitude 
towards corruption, and it will be a determinant of an enforcer’s decision to ask for a 
bribe.  To  guarantee  monotonicity  of  the  last  expression  with  respect  to  b  and  q,  we 
assume that it is equal to 1 if both the numerator and the denominator are equal to 0.
18 
• Setting the Bribe Level 
After a violation, there will always be room for mutually beneficial corruption 
between an opportunistic offender and an enforcer. An opportunistic offender prefers to 
pay a bribe rather than the (weakly larger) fine and the enforcer prefers to take the bribe 
                                                 
17 Since v is uniformly distributed over  ] , 0 [ v  and d is a constant, v/d is uniformly distributed over the 
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18 That is, if neither the opportunistic nor the righteous types are violating the rule, any off the equilibrium 






rather than reporting the violation. The question that remains is how the level of the bribe 
that will change hands is determined. 
Many earlier studies on corruption in enforcement adopt the assumption that the 
bribe level is determined through Nash bargaining. This amounts to assuming that the 
bribe level increases proportionally with the fine level, where the ratio of the two depends 
on the relative bargaining powers of the parties involved. If we were to employ the same 
assumption here, there would always be a fine level such that the corresponding bribe 
level  exceeds  d v /   and  hence  fully  deters  violations  for  opportunistic  and  righteous 
potential offenders alike. However, sustaining such a large bribe level is not compatible 
with the cooperative nature of the corruption phenomenon we aim to study. To see this, 
note that if the bribe level were to be reduced below  d v /  for the same fine level, then all 
types of enforcers would like to ask for bribes knowing that there is no righteous offender 
violating  the  rule.  Similarly,  some  opportunistic  types  of  potential  offenders  would 
violate the rule, knowing that they will get away by paying the bribe rather than the 
prohibitively high fine. As a result, both parties would be better off with a lower level of 
bribe and hence have an interest in committing to a bribe level prior to the violation 
decisions. 
To accommodate the need for a commitment device, we introduce a corruption 
syndicate to our model. This syndicate consists of the corrupt enforcers and is in charge 
of sustaining a bribe level that will maximize the expected return of these enforcers. In 
the  process  of  setting  the  bribe  level,  the  syndicate  takes  the  responsiveness  of  the 
violation behavior into account.
19 Recall that p is the proportion of opportunistic types 
within the population of potential offenders, and that  )] ( ( 1 [ b f q f F − − −  and  )] ( 1 [ f F −  
are the violation probabilities for the opportunistic and the righteous types respectively. 
Therefore, after f is announced, b is set to maximize 
ed c E f F p bd b f q f F p ] corrupt   is enforcer    | [ )] ( 1 )[ 1 ( ))] ( ( 1 [ − − − − − −     (3) 
subject to b ≤ f.   
                                                 
19 It can be argued that setting the bribe level to maximize the enforcers’ return from the bribes rather than 
the offenders’ gain from corruption amounts to giving the upper hand to the enforcers in the bargaining 







The  first  term  in  the  objective  function  above  is  the  bribe  revenue  from  the 
opportunistic violators and the second term
20 represents the expected cost of exposure by 
the righteous violators. Recall that the enforcers decide to join the syndicate first and then 
the syndicate decides on the bribe level. The cost of exposure for the enforcers, who have 
already made the decision to join, does not depend on the syndicate’s bribe decision. 
Moreover,  the  detection  and  the  exposure  rates  and  the  population  proportion  of  the 
righteous types are all constant. Therefore the second term in the objective function is 
independent of the bribe level and the solution to the syndicate’s maximization problem 
can be rewritten as  
b b f q f F b
f b
ˆ ))] ˆ ( ( 1 [ max arg ˆ − − − ∈
≤ .      (4) 
This maximization problem reveals that the syndicate’s bribe setting decision is 
quite similar to a monopolist’s pricing decision. The trade off is between increasing the 
revenue from a single violation and increasing the amount of violations that take place. 
Notice that when the entire enforcement force is corrupt, i.e., q=1, and the constraint b ≤ 
f is slack, then the syndicate will set the bribe to  d v 2 /  and trigger violations by half of 
the  opportunistic  potential  offenders.  For  lower  corruption  levels  than  the  complete 
capture of the enforcement, the demand for violations is less responsive to the bribe level. 
In this case, the optimal bribe is higher.  
• Corruption decision 
An enforcer joins the syndicate if and only if she is willing to ask for a bribe. The 
level  of  the  bribe  and  the  violation  rates  within  the  opportunistic  and  the  righteous 
segments of the population are relevant for the participation decisions of the enforcers. 
These  are  yet  to  be  determined  at  the  time  that  the  enforcers  make  their  decisions. 
However,  a  rational  enforcer  can  perceive  these  equilibrium  variables  in  advance.  
Enforcers  are  assumed  to  be  risk  neutral.  Therefore,  an  enforcer  joins  the  corruption 
syndicate if her expected gain from the bribe is higher than the expected cost of exposure. 
Recall that r is the probability that an offender is opportunistic, conditional on violating 
                                                 
20 The expectation in the second term refers to the expected cost of exposure for an enforcer conditional on 







the rule. Accordingly, an enforcer asks for a bribe if  ec r rb ) 1 ( − > .
21 For an outsider who 
does not observe the enforcer’s private information, the probability that she asks for a 
bribe













               (5) 
where G( ) is the cumulative distribution function of the random variable ec.
23  
 
III. THE EQUILIBRIUM  
  The  variables  q,  b,  and  r  that  solve  for  lines  (2),  (4),  and  (5)  simultaneously 
summarize the violators’ and the enforcers’ behavior in equilibrium.
24 One feature of the 
equilibrium  is  immediate  from  equations  (2)  and  (5).  Given  a  fixed  bribe  level,  the 
proportion of the corrupt officers (q) is increasing in the proportion of the opportunistic 
types within the violators (r) and vice versa. A small initial increase in either one of these 
two variables can compound into a much higher corruption level in the enforcement and a 
much larger rate of cooperation within the violators. This is a direct implication of the 
fact that the benefits of corruption / cooperation are increasing with the participation on 
the other side of the transaction.
25 
                                                 
21 An enforcer is assumed not to ask for a bribe if her expected gain is exactly equal to zero. 
 
22 Even though our underlying assumption is to take the enforcer as the instigator of the corrupt transaction, 
the analysis here is also relevant for environments where the offender initiates corruption by offering a 
bribe. After receiving this offer, an enforcer’s consent to corruption may still depend on the perceived 
proportion of opportunistic types within the offenders, since the bribe offer can also be a setup to detect 
corrupt enforcers.  
  
23 Since c is uniformly distributed over  ] , 0 [ c and e is a constant, ec is uniformly distributed over the 
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24 In an earlier version of this paper, we utilized an alternative timing, where the enforcers decide to enter in 
the  corruption  syndicate  after  the  syndicate  commits  to  the  bribe  level.  Under  this  assumption,  the 
equilibrium violation and corruption rates can be identified as functions of fine and bribe levels by solving 
(2) and (5) simultaneously. In that case, the corruption rate (q) enters in the syndicate’s maximization in (3) 
as a function of the bribe level (b). Our results are robust to this change in the timing.      
 
25 A similar “snowballing” aspect of corruption is also present in the study of Chang, Lai, and Yang (2000). 






We now turn to solving for the equilibrium levels of the endogenous variables (q, 
b, and r) as functions of the fine level. Notice that, the relevant distributions in lines (2), 
(4), and (5) are the distributions of the violation values and exposure costs adjusted with 
the probabilities of detection, i.e., the distributions of v/d and ec. To simplify the notation, 
we define  d v v / ~ =  and  c e c = ~  as the highest possible levels of the adjusted valuation 
and the adjusted cost. The assumption of uniform distribution makes it possible to find 
closed form solutions for the equilibrium variables.
26 The following proposition outlines 
this solution.   
Proposition  1:
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corruption  expands  within  the  enforcement  force.  In  contrast,  our  snowballing  property  is  due  to  the 
decreasing probabilities of matching with incorrupt / righteous parties.  
 
26 The assumption of uniform distribution is also instrumental in ruling out the possibility of multiple 
equilibria. Without any structure on the distributions, it is conceivable to have more than one solution that 
would satisfy lines (2), (4), and (5). This indicates that the same fine level may support different levels of 
bribe, corruption, and violation rates and that the enforcement parameters are  not always  sufficient to 
explain the violation levels. This is consistent with Schrag and Scotchmer’s (1997) observation of the self-
reinforcing nature of the crime. 
 
27 The proof of this proposition, not given here to avoid cluttering, is available from the authors upon 
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Proposition  1  separates  the  parameter  space  into  two  parts.  The  first  class  of 
parameters (studied in part (i) of the proposition) represents the case where the (adjusted) 
cost of corruption relative to the (adjusted) value of the crime is low and the proportion of 
opportunistic types within the population is high. For this case, there are two ranges of 
fine levels to examine. For low levels of the fine, the bribe level is equal to the fine, the 
corruption  level  increases  linearly  until  it  reaches  to  the  upper  bound  of  complete 
corruption of the enforcement, and the proportion of opportunistic violators is equal to 
the proportion in the entire population of potential violators. For high levels of the fine, 
the  bribe  level  is  v ~ /2,  there  is  complete  corruption  of  the  enforcement,  and  the 
proportion of the opportunistic violators increases until all the righteous violations are 
deterred when the fine reaches to v ~ . 
For the second class of parameters, a third range that consists of the intermediate 
fines (between levels f1 and f2) must be considered separately. Within this range, the bribe 
level is decreasing, to counteract the negative effect of the increasing fine on the demand 
for opportunistic violations. To explain why the bribe level decreases as a response to a 
higher fine level, we revert to the similarity between the syndicate’s bribe level decision 
and a monopolist’s pricing decision. A higher fine level decreases the violations by both 






downward  shift  in  the  demand  for  corruption.  By  decreasing  the  bribe  level,  the 
corruption syndicate takes on a portion of the cost imposed by the higher fines.  
Lowering the bribe level changes the composition of the offenders as well. Under 
a lower bribe level, the expected cost of a violation is lower for opportunistic offenders in 
comparison to the righteous ones. Hence the enforcers expect the righteous offenders to 
have  a  larger  presence  within  the  group  of  all  offenders.  This,  in  turn,  increases  the 
enforcers’ net gain from corruption. Accordingly a larger set of enforcers decide to enter 
in the corruption syndicate. Now that the enforcers are more likely to ask for bribes, the 
expected cost of violation decreases further for the opportunistic offenders. As a result, in 
this  third  range  of  fine  levels,  the  proportion  of  the  corrupt  enforcers  and  the 
opportunistic offenders are increasing in the fine level with a much higher rate. This 
observation will be crucial in establishing the nonmonotonicity of the extent of violations 
in the fine level.  
The equilibrium above reveals an interesting feature of our model. Regardless of 
the  parameterization,  there  is  no  fine  level  that  fully  deters  violations  by  both 
opportunistic  and  righteous  types.  It  is  easy  to  observe  this  for  non-maximal  fines 
( v f ~ < ). Under such a fine level f, any potential offender who values the violation higher 
than f would violate regardless of the level of the bribe. In contrast, a maximal fine level 
( v f ~ ≥ ) deters all the righteous violators. In this case, any violation would be attributed 
to opportunistic types. Knowing that there is no possibility of exposure, all enforcers ask 
for  bribes  regardless  of  their  exposure  costs.  In  other  words,  a  maximal  fine  will 
eliminate the possibility of making use of the (voluntary) monitoring service that the 
righteous offenders provide naturally. In this case, the bribe level equals v ~ /2. This bribe 
motivates half of the opportunistic types to violate the rule. Therefore, the equilibrium 
will induce a positive violation rate (equal to p/2) under a maximal fine as well.
28 
While this discussion shows that there is no fine level to fully deter violations, it 
does not reveal the optimal fine level that would minimize the violations. In the following 
section, we address this question with the help of an example.  
                                                 
28  Equilibrium  violation  is  also  observed  in  moral  hazard  models,  where  enforcers  make  individual 
decisions to exert effort to detect violations. If there is no violation in equilibrium, the government cannot 
motivate an enforcer to incur the monitoring costs. See Marjit and Shi (1998), Mookherjee and Png (1995), 







IV. AN EXAMPLE 
In this section, we study a specific parameterization of our model and derive the 
bribe level and the rates of enforcer corruption and violator cooperation as functions of 
the  fine  level.  The  resulting  example  demonstrates  that  the  violation  rate  may  be 
nonmonotonic  and  moreover  the  minimum  violation  rate  may  be  attainable  under  an 
intermediate fine level rather than the maximal fine. 
Recall that the relevant exogenous parameters of our model are the proportion of 
opportunistic types in the population (p), the upper bound on the violation valuations 
adjusted with the detection probability (v ~ ), and the upper bound on the exposure cost for 
a corrupt enforcer adjusted with the exposure probability (c ~ ). For this example, we set 
these parameters to the following values: p=0.5, v ~ =1, c ~ =2.  
Applying  part  (ii)  of  Proposition  1,  we  can  derive  the  bribe,  corruption,  and 
opportunistic violation levels as functions of the fine level:    
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The resulting q and r values are plotted against varying levels of f in panels (a) and (b) of 







      (a)            (b)   
Figure 1. Changes in the Ratios of Corrupt Enforcers (a) and Opportunistic Violators (b) 
for Different Levels of Fines 
 
Values  0.732  and  0.875  correspond  to  f1  and  f2  in  Proposition  1.  For  modest 
values of the fine (f < 0.732), the revenue maximizing level of the bribe is as large as the 
fine itself. Within this range of fines, a small increase in the fine level reduces violations 
of both the righteous and opportunistic types of potential offenders at the same rate, since 
the bribe will increase at the same rate as the fine. For large values of the fine (f ≥ 0.875), 
violations are deterred for the righteous types, whose valuations are below f. Due to the 
elimination of most of the righteous types from the pool of offenders, all enforcer types 
find it optimal to ask for a bribe. In this case, the bribe level that maximizes the bribe 
revenue is b=1/2. 
Finally, for the intermediate range of fines (0.732 ≤ f < 0.875), the bribe level 
falls with an increase in the fine. In this range, a decline in the bribe countervails a rise in 
the fine to give the opportunistic types an additional incentive to violate the rule and to 
increase the probability of cooperation conditional on a violation. 
Given  the  equilibrium  bribe  level,  we  can  also  pin  down  the  probability  of 
violations  as  a  function  of  the  fine  (Figure  2).  Violations  by  the  righteous  potential 
offenders  monotonically  decline  in  the  fine  level.  Violations  by  the  opportunistic 
potential offenders are also decreasing for small fine levels. In contrast, for larger fine 

























levels,  higher  corruption  among  the  enforcers  and  lower  bribe  levels  make  the 
opportunistic offenders more likely to violate the rule. 
The total violation rate is minimized (approximately) under the intermediate fine 
level  of  0.82.  The  bribe  level  that  corresponds  to  this  fine  is  0.6.  Consistency  of 
expectations requires that the cooperation probability conditional on violating the rule is 
r=0.61, and corruption rate among the enforcers is q=0.47. The resulting minimized rate 
of violation is around 0.23 (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Average Violation Rate for Different Levels of Fines 
 
In contrast, if the fine is set at a level that deters all the righteous type violations (f 
≥  1),  then  the  equilibrium  bribe  level  will  be  lower  (b=0.5),  all  violators  would  be 
opportunistic types (r=1), and all enforcers will choose to ask for a bribe (q=1).
29 The 
resulting violation rate under this high fine level will be higher (0.25), since half of the 
opportunistic types will violate the rule.  
                                                 
29 Notice that wiping out all the violations by the righteous types is not necessary for complete corruption 
of the enforcement. As long as the cost of exposure is bounded from above, we can support complete 
corruption with a small enough but positive level of righteous violations. The assumption that there is a fine 
level to rule out all the righteous violations is not crucial for our results. We can modify our model to 
account for violations that righteous types commit by mistake even under the maximal fine and get similar 






Under this parameterization of our model, the maximal fine is suboptimal for a 
policy  maker  who  is  trying  to  minimize  the  violation  rate.  Of  course,  there  may  be 
considerations other than the extent of violations for a policy maker such as a lower 
corruption rate or a higher fine revenue. Notice that either consideration would increase 
the advantages of the intermediate fine levels since the corruption rate is maximized and 
the fine revenue is zero under the maximal fine.    
 
V. THE OPTIMALITY OF NONMAXIMAL FINES 
  In this section, we investigate the conditions under which the optimal fine level is 
i) maximal as suggested by Becker (1968) and most of the literature to follow, or ii) an 
intermediate one, as in the example in the previous section.  









,  then  the  maximal  fine  ( v f ~ ≥ )  minimizes  the 
violation rate.  
Proof:  The  hypothesis  of  the  proposition  corresponds  to  the  class  of 
parameterizations studied in part (i) of Proposition 1. For values of f smaller than  2 / ~ v , b 
equals f. Therefore, any increase in the fine level reduces the violations by the righteous 
and the opportunistic types by the same rate. For values of f larger than  2 / ~ v , the bribe 
level is constant at  2 / ~ v  and there is full corruption of the enforcement. So, half the 
opportunistic types will violate the rule for larger levels of the fine. The violations by the 
righteous types are strictly decreasing for  v f ~ < , and constant at 0 for larger f. Hence, the 
total violation rate is strictly decreasing in f for  v f ~ < , and constant at p/2 for larger f. 
This implies that the violations are minimized under maximal fines. ■  
The  previous  proposition  identifies  a  relation  between  the  c v ~ / ~   ratio  and  the 
population  proportion  of  the  opportunistic  types  p  under  which  the  optimal  fine  is 
maximal. Similarly, we can find another relation that ensures that the optimal fine is 
intermediate as in the previous example.  
Proposition 3: If 










< , then the maximal fine ( v f ~ ≥ ) is suboptimal, 






Proof: The violation rate under the maximal fine is p/2. To prove the proposition, 












2 , we can use part (ii) of Proposition 1 to solve for the equilibrium 
levels of the endogenous variables. Recall that f1 defined in Proposition 1 was shown to 
be the highest fine level such that the bribe equals the fine. The total violation rate under 









= − ,  which  is  smaller  than  p/2  if  and  only  if  the 
hypothesis of the proposition is satisfied. ■ 
Propositions  2  and  3  suggest  a  particular  way  to  employ  the  fine  level  in 
conjunction  with  other  policy  instruments.  Recall  that  the  detection  probability  of  a 
violator, the exposure probability of a corrupt enforcer, and the distribution of the cost of 
exposure are taken as exogenous parameters in our model. An increase in the detection 
and exposure probabilities, or a proportional increase in the enforcers’ exposure costs 
(which is represented as a higher c  in our model) will all imply a smaller  c de v c v / ~ / ~ =  
ratio. If the government finds the opportunity to increase any of the parameters d, e, or c , 
the  c v ~ / ~ ratio can shift from a higher level that justifies the use of maximal fine to a 
smaller level that warrants implementing an intermediate fine. In other words, reducing 
the fine can be the right complementary policy for increasing the violation / corruption 
detection rates, or the punishment levels for corruption.   
Another immediate corollary from Propositions 2 and 3 is the fact that whatever 
the proportion of the opportunistic types (p), we can find a level of  c v ~ / ~  to justify either 
the maximal or the intermediate fine levels. Similarly, since 2(1-p)/p is unbounded from 
below, Proposition 2 implies that for all levels of  c v ~ / ~ , we can find p large enough to 
render the maximal fine the appropriate policy to minimize violations. However, since 
2(1-p)/(2-p)
2 has ½ as an upper bound, Proposition 3 implies that we can find p small 
enough to justify intermediate fines only when  c v ~ / ~  is lower than ½. We relax this upper 
bound on  c v ~ / ~  further with our final proposition. 
Proposition 4: If  c v ~ / ~  is lower than 2, the optimal fine is non-maximal (smaller 






Proof: Let the fine level be equal to  2 1 ) 1 ( ˆ f z zf f − + = , where f1 and f2 are as 
defined in Proposition 1 and z is a real number on the open interval (0,1). We will show 
that the violation rate under this fine is smaller than p/2, which is the violation rate under 
the maximal fine, as p approaches to 0.  
We  use  Proposition  1  to  calculate  the  violation  rate  under  fine  f ˆ .  As  p 
approaches to 0, the relevant part of the proposition is part (ii). By construction,  f ˆ  is an 
intermediate  fine  level  between  f1  and  f2.  Recall  that  the  violation  rate  is 
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1 ~ < + . 
Accordingly, violation rate (6) approaches to 0 in the limit.
30 However, this does not 
prove the optimality of an intermediate fine, since the violation rate under the maximal 
fine, p/2 also approaches to 0. To reach to a conclusion, we examine the limit of the ratio 
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+ and the term in the square brackets 
approaches to 1. Since  c v ~ 2 ~ < , we can always find a positive z that is small enough to 
make this limit less than 1, which means that the violation rate under  f ˆ  is smaller than 
the violation rate under the maximal fine. ■  
Propositions 3 and 4 together highlight how our model links up with a standard 
model without corruption. If the exposure costs for corruption are fully deterring (c ~ =∞) 
                                                 







or there is no opportunistic potential violator (p=0) our model boils down to the standard 
model for which the optimal fine is maximal. However, as parameters  c ~ and p approach 
to these counterparts in the standard model, Propositions 3 and 4 imply that the optimal 




In this paper, we have sought an answer to whether it is possible to set fines for 
various  types  of  violations  in  order  to  make  rules  more  effective,  while  taking  the 
resulting  incentives  for  corruption  into  account.  For  this  purpose,  we  developed  a 
theoretical model and explored the ranges of fines that might be needed to strike the right 
balance between effectiveness and enforceability. 
We showed that, as long as there is a potential for corruption, there exists no fine 
level that completely eliminates all violations. Moreover, the fine level that minimizes 
violations may be an intermediate one rather than a seemingly prohibitive fine. Thus, our 
findings  imply  that  substantial  increases  in  the  fine  levels  associated  with  certain 
violations  may  not  be  the  most  effective  strategy  to  reduce  the  incidence  of  these 
violations in settings where law enforcement officers are likely to be corrupt.  
Our major departure point from the existing literature has been the separation of 
the intensity of a potential offender’s willingness/tendency to violate the rule and his 
willingness/tendency  to  engage  in  corruption.  We  have  shown  on  the  basis  of  this 
separation that the policy makers can use the offenders in the incorruptible segment of the 
population to curb the corruption potential within the other segment, as this incorruptible 
segment naturally serves as a group helping monitor corrupt activity.  
We have assumed, perhaps unrealistically, that the intensities of the willingness to 
violate and to engage in corrupt activities are independent. While it is conceivable for 
potential offenders with higher valuations for the violation of the rule to be more agreeing 
to  corrupt  offers  in  real  life  settings,  the  policy  implication  of  our  analysis  would 
                                                 
31 As  c ~ approaches to infinity and p approaches to 0, an intermediate fine level in-between f1 and f2 is 
optimal as opposed to a maximal fine weakly larger than  v ~ . The upper bound of this interval, f2, is smaller 
than  v ~ . However, since f1 and f2 both approach tov ~ , all the intermediate fine levels approach to a maximal 
fine. Therefore there is no discontinuity in the optimal fine level when the standard model is considered as 






continue to hold even in the presence of such a positive correlation between violation and 
corruption potentials of individuals. In fact, such a positive correlation would make the 
need for policy maker’s use of low valuation offenders even stronger. Similarly, we have 
assumed that the willingness to engage in corruption does not depend on the fine level. In 
reality,  higher  fines  may  incline  offenders  to  cooperate  with  corrupt  enforcers. 
Nevertheless,  this  additional  concern  would  add  to  the  benefits  of  employing  an 
intermediate fine rather than a seemingly prohibitive one.   
We formalized our policy implications for a government whose sole objective is 
reducing the violations of law. Such a  government ignores the increase in the utility 
levels  of  the  economic  agents  who  commit  the  violations  or  who  enjoy  the  bribes 
collected due to these violations. In essence, this government is maximizing a welfare 
function which is increasing in the utility levels of potential victims of these violations 
but which does not respond to the utility levels of the potential violators or the enforcers. 
Such a welfare function would reconcile the policy maker in this paper with the welfarist 
approach advocated by Kaplow and Shavell (2001). 
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